The Recurrent Causal-Process Theory of Consciousness: Minimal Causal Agency under Biological Constraints

Consciousness research faces a persistent commensurability problem: competing theories optimize for disparate metrics—reportability, integration, or discriminability—without a shared causal reference frame for adjudicating boundary cases. This criterion scarcity becomes most acute in developmental, comparative, and pathological contexts, where behavioral complexity is frequently misread as evidence of conscious agency.

I propose UBCAT (Under Biological-Constraints: Causal Agency Theory of Consciousness), a constraint-grounded causal framework that defines consciousness as minimal causal agency: the conjunction of orthogonal self-referential processing (Axis A) and environment-mediated causal intervention (Axis B) under biological constraints, enabling principled attribution across developmental, comparative, and motor-impaired contexts.

The framework is grounded in three non-negotiable biological constraints—homeostatic viability, metabolic economy, and developmental implementability—that delimit which control architectures are physically realizable in living systems. At the mechanistic level, UBCAT locates consciousness in the closure of recurrent sensory–interoceptive integration loops, in which external and bodily signals are continuously integrated to generate top-down causal regulation of action.

UBCAT is subjected to a developmental stress test reconstructing how causal prerequisites become structurally instantiable across five phases of the proto-conscious stage. Early social and affective phenomena—including social referencing, joint attention, and empathic behaviors—are reinterpreted as regulatory strategies rather than markers of conscious agency, blocking retrospective projection of adult constructs onto pre-agentic systems.

The framework introduces Biological Signals of Consciousness (BSC) as a regime-level adjudication methodology complementing NCC, generates falsifiable predictions, and provides discrimination criteria applicable where existing theories most commonly fail.

Graphical Abstract

Minimal causal agency
UBCAT’s core criterion. Conjunction of Axis A (self-referential processing) and Axis B (environment-mediated causal intervention), where internal states function as causal variables for action selection and the environment is recruited as an independent causal medium.

Causal loop closure / loop-closure organization
Completed causal loop where action through the environment readjusts internal states. Circulating structure of internal state → action → environment → modified internal state, distinguishing it from simple reactivity.

Environment-modulated regulation
Passive state adjustment to external environmental changes. Non-agentic regulation where internal states do not function as explicit causal variables for action selection (Axis A unmet).

Environment-mediated causal interaction
Active recruitment and manipulation of environmental elements as independent causal media to regulate internal states. Capacity to utilize external materials as causal pathways (Axis B met).

Self-referential embodied state
Internal bodily/interoceptive states explicitly recruited as causal variables in action selection. Not mere state-modulation but “selecting actions for reasons of one’s own embodied state.”

Minimal self-attribution
Treating one’s own states as causal reasons for action selection. Minimal self-reference within causal control structure, distinct from conceptual selfhood or explicit self-recognition.

Proto-conscious
Developmental stage prior to structural implementation of minimal causal agency (UBCAT criteria). Advanced environment-modulated responses exist but Axis A+B loop closure is structurally unavailable.

Biological Signals of Consciousness (BSC)
Prerequisite biological signals for consciousness attribution. Global conditions confirming homeostatic viability, metabolic economy, and regime stability as necessary preconditions for NCC interpretation.

Consciousness-like
Phenomena behaviorally/neurobiologically resembling consciousness but failing UBCAT’s minimal causal agency criteria (Axis A+B). Early developmental social/affective responses or advanced automation belong here.

Times are in KST.

Preparing.

Times are in KST.

2025.12.31 17:59 Neuroscience of Consciousness ― Submission

A Causal-Process Framework for the Functional and Mechanistic Definition of Consciousness (PFMD)

2026.01.09 04:34 Trends in Cognitive Sciences ― Presubmission proposal

Modulated, Not Mediated: The Causal Organization of Proto-Consciousness.

2026.01.13 03:49 Trends in Cognitive Sciences ― Rejected

Comments. Our editorial decisions depend on various factors, including recent coverage of related topics, other articles in our pipeline, and our current journal priorities.

2026.01.22 00:13 Neuroscience of Consciousness ― Submission

Modulated, Not Mediated: The Causal Organization of Proto-Consciousness

2026.01.29 12:05 Neuroscience of Consciousness ― Rejected

Comments. The manuscript offers an interesting critique of certain limitations in developmental neuroscience; however, the proposed framework ultimately falls short of adequately addressing these issues. The PFMD is described only in broad and relatively vague terms, and its scope appears so expansive that it engages more directly with general questions of cognition than with consciousness per se. In addition, the central distinction between environment-modulated and environment-mediated processing is not articulated with sufficient conceptual or mechanistic detail to support the article’s main thesis. Finally, the submission forms part of a series of three closely interdependent manuscripts that extensively cross-reference one another. This degree of interdependence makes it difficult to assess the present article on its own merits, which is problematic within the context of the journal’s review process.

> After that, PFMD and Proto-Conscious were restructured into a single manuscript.

2026.01.31 03:19 Behavioral and Brain Sciences ― Proposal Submission

The Causal-Process Architecture of Consciousness: Minimal Biological Agency ― Organization to Reorganization

2026.02.02 05:06 Behavioral and Brain Sciences ― Rejcected

Comments. I read your target article proposal with great interest. This looks like substantial and important work.
Unfortunately, however, it is not appropriate for BBS. We’re an unusual journal in that we publish very few articles. Given that we hope to cover all of cognitive science and neuroscience, we can’t consider too many submissions on related topics. And, since we have two articles on consciousness in press and another under review, I’m afraid that I’m unable to consider your submission.
I should stress the obvious, which is that this decision is not a judgment about the quality of this proposal, just its suitability for this journal. Many excellent papers that BBS cannot publish subsequently appear in first-rate journals.

> This manuscript was subsequently named UBCAT.

2026.02.21 21:28 Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews ― Submission

The Recurrent Causal-Process Theory of Consciousness Minimal Causal Agency under Biological Constraints

2026.02.23 18:31 Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews ― Rejcected

Comments. While your study is of potential interest, the topic of your manuscript falls outside of the scope of this journal. For an overview of the Aims & Scope, please have a look at the journals’ homepage.

2026.02.26 16:23 Consciousness and Cognition Submission

The Recurrent Causal-Process Theory of Consciousness Minimal Causal Agency under Biological Constraints

2026.02.26 17:03 Consciousness and Cognition Rejcected

Comments.
– Although the problems being addressed are potentially of interest to our readership, your manuscript does not meet the required quality standards to be considered for publication.
– The research results reported are too premature for publication. More work is needed to substantiate the conclusions in your manuscript.

– The field of consciousness research already has at least 25+ theories of consciousness. It remains unclear how this manuscript could make a worthwhile contribution to the field of consciousness science. The theory presented in it is speculative, and the theory covers a too broad range of various phenomena and concepts. It vaguely relates to several already existing theories, but it is unclear how it could become more useful than the already existing theories. Therefore, this manuscript is unlikely to be helpful in advancing the theoretical explanation of consciousness. Some new empirical data and strict tests of the predictions of the theory should be presented, to show that this theory has greater predictive and explanatory power than the already existing major theories. In its present form and without empirical tests and data, the theory is not publishable.

Author Response.

Thank you for your editorial assessment of my submission. I fully respect the journal’s screening process and I am not asking for reconsideration. I am writing only to clarify how the manuscript is positioned, so that my next revision and redirection can be better aligned with the journal’s expectations.
For clarity, the manuscript was submitted as a Review Article (theory-driven review), not as a regular empirical research article. The manuscript is an integrative theoretical review that synthesizes and evaluates multiple empirical literatures and existing theories, rather than being confined to a single theoretical paradigm. Its scope is broader because its aim is to provide a cross-theory adjudication framework for boundary cases.
1) Evidential status of the manuscript
The manuscript does not present new, independently collected empirical datasets; that is correct. However, it is not intended as a free-floating proposal. It is written as a criterion-based, constraint-grounded framework built on existing empirical and clinical literatures (development, comparative cognition, disorders of consciousness, interoception/agency), and it is organized around operational distinctions.
2) Relationship to existing theories
The manuscript does not aim to loosely associate itself with multiple accounts. Instead, it introduces an explicit “translation/reordering” layer (Table 4; Section 5) that re-expresses major constructs and theory-terms by what they presuppose about causal ownership and control organization, in order to make boundary-case adjudication commensurable across domains.
3) What the manuscript adds beyond existing accounts
The intended contribution is not “one more comprehensive theory,” but a shared causal reference frame for adjudicating cases that are systematically difficult under the dominant inference habits (e.g., equating behavioral complexity with conscious agency). The focus is therefore discriminative and methodological: a criterion for minimal causal agency under biological (physical) constraints, with explicit boundary clarifications.
4) Testability and discrimination routes
While I agree that new empirical tests would ultimately be necessary to establish comparative advantage, the manuscript does already specify falsification-oriented and discriminating routes (Section 6), including topology-shift predictions, regime-conditioning rules for interpreting NCC-like signatures, and competing-interpretation test logic. These are intended as concrete guides for how the framework could be challenged rather than protected.
5) Usefulness to the field (as framed here)
In the manuscript’s framing, “usefulness” is not measured by breadth of phenomenon coverage, but by whether the framework improves principled attribution and reduces systematic misclassification in developmental, comparative, and motor-impaired/pathological contexts—precisely where metric mismatch and criterion scarcity are most acute.
If a contribution of this type would need additional elements beyond the current manuscript to meet the journal’s quality threshold, I would be grateful for one or two concrete pointers (e.g., what would most materially strengthen such a framework manuscript). This would greatly help me revise the work appropriately for a future submission—whether to this journal or a more suitable venue.